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Abstract: This study evaluates discontinuity that is induced by the two-stage lawmaking 
process of EU directives and discussed in the jurisprudential literature as another source for 
the EU’s democratic deficit. While directives must be transposed into national law, their 
lengthy transposition period has raised the normative question about the extent to which 
governments of today can politically and reliably commit domestic majorities of tomorrow. 
From a political science perspective, this jack-in-the-box-effect is particularly critical in 
systems with restrictive voting procedures and high agency loss because the parliamentary 
principal is unable to learn about the behaviour of the governmental agent and can hardly 
change or amend the decision of the former government. Hence, the empirical task is to 
identify the potential for discontinuity in EU lawmaking which requires measuring the 
governmental activities in the implementation process and to compare the preferences of the 
former and current majorities.  
This is the first study which empirically analyzes the potential of discontinuity by 
combining statistics on the implementation process in the 15 member states with preference 
indicators for their governments over a period of almost 20 years. The findings reveal that 
parliaments are almost excluded from this process. On closer inspection, the results show that 
the preferences of the former and the newly elected representatives differ drastically in about 
one third of all cases, in particular in Austria, Denmark, France, Sweden – and to a lesser 
extent – in Ireland, Greece and Luxembourg where public support for European integration 
has also notably decreased in recent years. 
  1Discontinuity in Two-stage EU Lawmaking 
This article investigates a constitutional element of democratic government, namely the 
temporal restriction of political authority and power, which has been disregarded in the 
political science literature on the EU’s democratic deficit (see for this debate, i.e. Dehousse 
1995, Majone 1998, 2000, Moravcsik 2002, Follesdahl and Hix 2005, Rittberger 2005). Much 
of this literature focuses on the distribution of power in EU legislative decision making, in 
particular whether the European Parliament (EP) is involved or not, but it remains an open 
question whether and to what extent representatives of today can commit the representatives 
of tomorrow who can hardly bloc, change or amend the decisions of the former on time 
(Pernice 2005). Compared to the provisions in the member states, in which the authority and 
policy-making activities of elected representatives usually end with dissolution, the end of 
parliamentary sessions or the conclusion of the legislative term, and in which pending 
initiatives usually die to prevent discontinuity between the mandate and policy making (see 
for more detail, Döring 1995: 242), Commission proposals neither die, nor does EU 
lawmaking allow for the direct control of the representatives in a temporally limited fashion. 
By contrast, in particular the implementation of directives induces a potential for discontinuity 
by conventionally establishing a two-year transposition period, in which the (newly elected) 
representatives might be obliged to implement the decision of the former without having a 
realistic chance to amend or revise it in a timely fashion.
1
Although discontinuity normatively poses a legitimacy problem particularly in 
systems with strong checks-and-balances and high agency loss when the principal – in terms 
of the directly elected parliamentary representatives of voters - lacks control of the 
governmental agents and is unable to learn about it, the evaluation of the empirical impact of 
discontinuity requires the identification of the extent to which governments of today can 
politically and reliably commit majorities of tomorrow, to which former and current 
representatives differ in their preferences, and to which these new majorities are able to learn 
about this process. This empirical examination is the main goal of the following analysis of 
discontinuity that may point to another possible source for the EU’s democratic deficit, which 
is directly related to the discussion about the involvement of the EP: while moral hazard and 
adverse selection usually give the (parliamentary) principal incentives to gather information 
about the (governmental) agent (Lupia 2003: 4), parliamentary learning is heavily restricted in 
                                                 
1 According to author (2007), the median proposal/adoption-time lag of EU initiatives has increased and slowed 
down decision making in the last ten years. In particular conflictual proposals, which provide for unanimous 
voting in the Council and parliamentary participation significantly increase the duration of the legislative 
process. 
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governmental agents can increase their discretionary power by hiding their preferences in 
secret Council negotiations and bypassing their domestic parliaments when they implement 
legislative decisions. This suggests that discontinuity allows expanding power over time, and 
neither the parliamentary majority nor the voter can find out whether and how the government 
was unwilling or unable to support the preferences of the principal. 
For the empirical analysis of discontinuity, major empirical challenges are to find out 
whether and to what extent the parliamentary principal can learn ex ante and ex post about the 
governmental agent’s behaviour, and to identify discontinuity problems by changing 
coalitions and preferences during the implementation process in all member states. For this 
purpose, this study uses longitudinal information on the transposition history of all directives 
in 15 member states and the governmental preferences from January 1986 to February 2003, 
the entry into force of the Nice Treaty. In addition to information on Commission proposals 
and EP participation, the database includes 1569 directives and their transposition records in 
the member states.
2 This sample of more than 8000 observations (15 countries times about 
1569) shall provide a solid empirical answer to two questions on the amount and extent of  
i)  domestic parliamentary inclusion in EU lawmaking by directives, 
ii)  discontinuity with respect to member state elections as well as changes in 
government and coalition preferences. 
The analysis attempts to answer whether and to what extent EU lawmaking suffers from a 
parliamentary deficit at the EU and domestic level, and whether and to what extent the EU 
requires the implementation of directives adopted by a former government, perhaps by 
another coalition with quite different preferences. In addition to the potential for change via 
elections, the analysis also specifies whether and how often governmental composition 
changed in the time between the adoption of the directive and the notification of national 
transposition measures as reported by the member states. However, since governmental 
composition can change despite preferences remaining the same, and conversely, 
governmental composition can remain stable despite changes in preferences, this study 
proposes the use of party manifestos to identify sector specific and EU related governmental 
(coalition) preferences. 
The remainder introduces the problem of discontinuity, discusses the lack of direct 
control of governmental agents providing insight into parliamentary involvement in the 
lawmaking of directives. Furthermore, the conventional domestic rules established to prevent 
                                                 
2 The ten new members are excluded from this study because their membership began in May 2004; thus, their 
transposition record is too short for a meaningful empirical examination. 
  3discontinuity are presented for the 15 member states, revealing a large discrepancy between 
domestic and EU provisions. Finally, discontinuity is empirically examined with respect to 
electoral events, governmental coalition and preference changes. The findings show that the 
two-stage process associated with directives not only curtails ex ante and ex post 
parliamentary control but it also establishes a notable potential for discontinuity. In the time 
between the adoption of a directive and the specified transposition deadline, elections and 
governmental change are found in about one third of all cases. More importantly, 
governmental preferences change within the course of most national transposition processes, 
even though these changes primarily refer to sector-specific policy making. In some countries, 
such as Austria, Sweden and France, we find notable preference changes between the 
government who agreed to Community legislation and the one responsible for implementing 
it, suggesting a high potential of discontinuity problems. 
 
Democracy and Discontinuity – A Comparative View on Temporal Power 
The continuity of representative democracy specifies authority and power temporally. 
Compared to inheritance, which ties the hands of newly elected governments by existing 
legislation and formerly adopted programs (Davis and Rose 1994), this temporal specification 
is designed to avoid personnel, formal and material discontinuity (Pernice 2005). In almost all 
democracies, discontinuity in personnel is conventionally prohibited by displacing the 
president and the dissolution of parliament, which usually includes all activities and 
parliamentary committees. Material discontinuity concerns legislative decision making and is 
usually avoided by settling initiatives at the end of the term, except for those cases not 
requiring formal adoption (Döring 1995). In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, this 
kind of parliamentary supremacy is more of a "gentlemen’s agreement with constitutional 
character," while in countries like Germany, scholars interpret this practice as common law. 
These provisions attempt to guarantee the temporal aspect of democracy and are, thus, a 
fundamental constitutional element of representative democracy in the member states of the 
EU. 
In particular in the normative jurisprudential literature, the central assertion is that 
discontinuity threatens to violate this principle (Pernice 2005). The most important facet of 
discontinuity concerns legislative decision making, which sometimes involves institutions and 
legislative bodies with permanent representation, such as the Austrian and German Bundesrat 
as well as the Council of Ministers. These bodies often represent (part of) the regional 
constituents of the political system, even though their delegates may change and are 
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initiatives made within these bodies are not necessarily settled at end of the legislative term, 
i.e. neither in the German nor the EU case. Other examples for possible discontinuity only 
exist in two EU countries, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. According to Grey (1982), bills 
die at the end of the legislative term, or with parliamentary dissolution in Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal (every four years), as well as in France 
(every five years). In three of these countries a provision exists for carrying a bill over after 
dissolution or expired legislative period (France, Ireland and Portugal). In Denmark and the 
United Kingdom, where parliamentary sittings are divided into sessions ranging from six 
months to a year, bills die at the end of the session or with dissolution. Sweden has a unique 
provision leading to the expiry of bills if they are not disposed of within one year following 
introduction. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 supplements and specifies the information provided by Grey’s survey (1982). With 
the exception of Luxembourg and the Netherlands, time limits are generally imposed on the 
passage of bills, and these are usually limited to the current legislative term or session. In 
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Sweden, bills die at the end of session. Belgium, 
Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Austria and Portugal usually limit legislative 
activities at the end of the legislative period or dissolution. In Germany and Austria, 
dissolution and continuity only apply to the Bundestag. In France, the Senate can still adopt a 
proposal from the dissolved national assemble under closed rule, while governmental and 
parliamentary bills usually expire with governmental change (Schorn 2000: 43-54). Belgian 
bills can survive dissolution or the end of the four year period, if they have already found 
approval in one of the Houses. 
While these formal hurdles exist for national legislation to prevent discontinuity, the 
EU has established a two-stage lawmaking-process which allows to exclude parliaments and 
to shift of political accountability over time. The most common example for this two-stage 
process in the EU is the transposition of directives, which define binding and enforceable 
guidelines for policy making that have to be implemented by the national legislator within a 
given (sometimes extensive) period of time (author). From a political science view, the 
conventional two year-transposition period of EU directives – which may be extended to 
several years in the event of successive treaty violation procedures or successful member state 
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Although there are several reasons for continued transposition delay, including political, 
economic or administrative restrictions, the possibility of governmental and/or preference 
change the question is to which extent does this obligation matter for the newly elected. 
In principle, such requirements do not necessarily threaten the legitimacy of a political 
system because the newly elected government can usually revise or amend the decision of the 
former. But compared to a few member states, where discontinuity problems may also arise, 
the EU has established a restrictive voting system which makes revisions and amendments by 
the newly elected government almost impossible. This system not only requires that the 
Commission would make an initiative in the sense of the newly elected representative, but the 
Council must also adopt the proposal by either unanimity or a qualified majority of about 72% 
in an enlarging EU, sometimes followed by the necessary support of the EP. This increases 
the potential of a Jack-in-the-Box-effect, which risks to dilute democratic accountability and 
legitimisation for political decisions, because parliament and voters are unable to control the 
policy making of their delegated representatives with their electoral vote - even if the results 
of the directive are not supported by the current majority, both the government and 
(sometimes) parliament are obligated to adopt the measures appropriate for implementing the 
directive and hardly able to initiate amendments or to change this policy. 
Compared to the political and scholarly debate on the EU’s democratic deficit that has 
raised attention to the powers of the EP, few insights and – to my knowledge – no empirical 
study exist on the discontinuity potential induced by the two-stage process of EU directives. 
Some might argue that the increasing participation of the EP sufficiently guarantees the direct 
link between the principal and the agent in EU lawmaking. On closer inspection, figure 1 lists 
the number of binding legislative cases (regulations, directives and decisions) and EP 
involvement from the mid-1980s to the coming into force of the Nice treaty in 2003. A quick 
inspection of the numbers seems to confirm Hix (2005) findings on a significantly higher 
inclusion of the EP, but the absolute number of cases with parliamentary participation has 
hardly increased in recent years. Similar to the number of directives, the number of cases with 
parliamentary participation remained almost constant over time. However, the number of 
regulations and decisions drastically decreased since the Maastricht treaty in 1993. Thus, the 
rate of parliamentary participation is only increasing due to lower legislative activities, while 
the number of directives remains constant over time. 
These findings on the relatively low participation rate of the EP and the higher relative 
importance of directives raise doubts on the EP’s ability to guarantee accountability, drawing 
  6the attention to the second stage of EU lawmaking where national parliaments can be 
involved in the implementation process. To reduce agency loss and to identify the 
discontinuity potential, the question is to what extent this implementation process includes 
national parliaments, particularly when the coalition and/or the preferences of the majority 
have changed. Put differently, if a parliamentary majority of tomorrow could control and 
revise the decisions of today's governments, discontinuity should pose no problem for the 
legitimacy of lawmaking; if parliaments are able to learn about this process, discontinuity 
should pose a minor problem because parliaments could make attempts to develop a counter-
strategy. However, if parliaments lack control and even information about this process due to 
their exclusion from policy making, the question is to what extent does this process force a 
member state to implement decisions when the coalition and/or the preferences of the 
majority have changed. When the majority knows neither what their governmental agent has 
promoted nor is informed about the implementation of the formers agent decision, 
discontinuity will raise agency loss and beg a serious legitimacy problem induced by the 
(growing) importance of directives. 
 
Discontinuity without Parliamentary Control 
The two-stage process of directives formally offers national parliaments ex ante and ex post 
influence when the legislation is adopted at the EU level and when it is implemented at the 
national level. However, although the criticism of the EU’s legitimacy centres around the 
parliamentary deficit, and although the Amsterdam treaty declares that domestic parliaments 
have an important role in legitimising the positions of the governmental representatives in the 
Council, a number of studies suggest that the member states vary little in the modest extent to 
which they allow parliaments to participate in the preparation of their governmental position 
on Commission proposals. In a recent study on domestic preference formation on 
Commission proposals, Baltz et al. (2005) find that only the “Scandinavian” model offers 
parliaments some access to this ex ante coordination process, while all other countries rarely 
include their parliaments and prefer coordinating their national position on Commission 
proposals among their ministries. Similarly, author (2006) demonstrate for the EU 
constitution-building process that this executive model also dominates national position 
formation for the preparation of constitutional policies. 
This suggests that a significant contribution to the parliamentary deficit in EU 
legislative decision making is made by the member states themselves. The governments of the 
member states have a good deal of discretion in deciding about the ex ante inclusion of their 
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informed about EU legislative decision making, which induces principal-agent problems from 
moral hazard (Lupia 1992). Accordingly, the national parliaments, as directly elected 
representatives and principals, regularly lack information about the governmental agent’s 
action, thus allowing the agent to choose her own views, including the possibility of adverse 
selection due to the secret nature of Council negotiations (Brehm and Gates 1997). As a 
result, parliamentary ex ante control and influence on the making of directives is very limited, 
and governments have significant discretionary power with the respective EU negotiations. 
A second possibility of parliamentary involvement on EU legislative decision making 
may exist ex post during the implementation stage of directives, which could offer learning 
about agent actions from others. While parliamentarians are directly elected, more politically 
concerned about the interests of the voters and will amend legislation, the executive rather 
focuses on the technical problems of policy making. For Majone, the EU is a regulatory 
agency addressing market failures, which produces by definition pareto-efficient outcomes 
and does not lack democratic foundation but credibility (Majone 1993, 2000). However, since 
this agency will implement prior (pareto-efficient) legislation even in the event of drastic 
preference change, the exclusion of parliamentary involvement should increase the risks of 
discontinuity. In particular in the case of “regulatory” directives, which are adopted by either 
the Commission, the Council, or, Council and EP, and require transposition into the domestic 
law of the member states, which is formally monitored by the Commission, this exclusion 
generates discontinuity problems. According to Article 249, a directive shall be binding, as to 
the result to be achieved, upon each member state to which it is addressed, but shall leave to 
the national authorities the choice of form and methods. If the Commission decides that a 
member state has failed to fulfil an obligation, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter 
after giving the state concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the state does not 
comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring 
the matter before the Court of Justice (Article 226), and significant sanctions can be imposed 
according to Article 228 in the event of further violation. 
Member states typically have to notify the implementing measures intended to achieve 
the results of the directive within a two-year period, even in the case of contradicting national 
law. Formally, member states cannot justify delay by domestic problems and restrictions, 
because the supremacy of EU legislation and the obligation to implement directives 
dominates any national provision even if this provision is a constitutional element (Prechal 
1996). This means that the implementation of directives does not require any additional 
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directive’s results. Delay or ineffective implementation is not only be punishable by monetary 
sanctions or provisions for liability, direct applicability also obliges national courts to rule 
conformably with the directive. Yet, member states differ in their implementation record, and 
the Commission does not prosecute all infringements (author 2005). Table 2 lists the number 
of adopted directives and the notification record of each member state. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Based on the CELEX Sector 7 database, table 2 lists in detail, how many directives applied to 
each member state, whether these member states reported a measure of transposition or not, 
the number of pending directives at time of data collection, the number of directives with a 
missing transposition deadline and the number of measures lacking a machine-readable date 
of transposition despite member state notification. Between 730 (Sweden) and 1600 
(Luxembourg) directives in total required transposition (resulting in 21,387 country*directive 
observations), and between 454 (Austria) and 1229 (Portugal) directives document 
transposition with at least one measure. 18 directives were pending at the time of data 
collection; between 57 and 193 fail to indicate a national transposition deadline. No adoption 
date for reported measures affects between 12 and 155 cases, and for between 63 and 279 
cases, we lack reported transposition measure despite expiration of the deadline. To 
investigate all “regular” cases only transposition measures are considered which are reported 
in the period between the adoption of the directive and the notification deadline. Upon closer 
inspection, this sample includes a total of 8382 member state transposition responses 
(country*directive) passed on time between 1.January 1986 and 1.February 2003, and having 
a transposition deadline prior to the date of the data collection in 1.November 2004.
3 Note that 
only directives passed after the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden on 1.January 1995 
are included in this sample. 
Since neither the inclusion of third parties in fire alarm oversight, nor policy patrol 
oversight - where the principals do the majority of the oversights themselves - can remedy the 
parliamentary information deficit, the question is how often are parliaments involved in the 
transposition stage, and how little ex post control parliaments have over their governmental 
agents. Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the numbers of all instruments notified by the member 
states within the prescribed transposition period. For some directives, a member state notified 
                                                 
3 Due to the average transposition period of two years, the tables and graphics refer to directives passed between 
1986 and 2002.  The directives from late 2002 and early 2003 were largely pending at the time of collection.  
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decrets, circulars, etc. To distinguish between the bureaucratic nature of this process and the 
question whether parliaments are excluded or not, figure 2a lists the annual share of 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary instruments used to implement directives, while figure 
2b illustrates the extent to which parliament has been involved or not.  
 
Figures 2a and 2b about here 
 
Unsurprisingly, some member states, in particular the United Kingdom and Ireland, exclude 
their parliaments almost completely from this second stage and transpose directives wherever 
possible with non-parliamentary instruments, such as regulations and statutory instruments. 
According to figure 2a, more than 85% of all measures used for the transposition of directives 
in the member states refer to non-parliamentary instruments, while less than only 15% 
directly involve domestic parliaments. This trend towards bureaucratic implementation of 
directives is visible for almost all member states over time and across most policy sectors 
(author). Even in countries that officially emphasize parliamentary participation, governments 
more and more refer to previous legislation as the legal basis for amendments and the use of 
non-parliamentary instruments in the transposition of directives. 
Figure 2b shows changes in the annual aggregate statistics of national parliamentary 
involvement for individual directives. Compared to the relative share of involvement 
illustrated in figure 2a, we also see that parliaments have little to say in absolute numbers. 
Only in Austria, and to a lesser extent in Denmark, Finland and Germany, do we find 
parliamentary participation in about half of the implementation cases; the average 
participation rate is only about 15%. These numbers clearly demonstrate that parliamentary ex 
post control hardly exists, revealing a large potential for agency loss, in particular when the 
governmental agent is unwilling or unable to serve the parliamentary principal’s interest. Only 
if the principal were to have complete information about the governmental agent’s actions, 
could agency losses be minimized, but the high share of parliamentary exclusion prohibits 
acquiring information on EU lawmaking. In the extreme, a “liberal” policy that was contested 
by the opposition in the national electoral campaign and refused by the voters could be 
implemented by bureaucratic means without parliamentary knowledge.  
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With regard to the very limited possibilities for parliamentary control, the identification of 
potential discontinuity in EU lawmaking demands empirical evaluation of the two-stage 
lawmaking process, which is an ambitious task for 15 countries over time. In general, the two-
stage nature of this process implies that the results are determined by two developments, i) the 
amount of directives and number of domestic elections, ii) government and preference change 
in the member states. A quick inspection of the EU legislative record has already revealed that 
the number of directives has remained relatively constant over the last twenty years, while the 
annual number of regulations dramatically decreased from about 500 in the beginning of the 
1990s to less than 100 regulations by the beginning of 2000s (see figure 1). Without 
consideration of the qualitative nature of EU legislation, this suggests that directives – and 
thus discontinuity in the implementation process – are becoming relatively more important for 
the evaluation of EU lawmaking. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Looking at the amount of directives and number of domestic elections, 2539 national 
responses were potentially subject to discontinuity via elections from the total sample of 8382 
cases. Particularly in Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Germany and Italy, many cases were 
subject to elections during the transposition period. On closer inspection, 2145 cases 
experienced governmental change, a few without elections due to a change of coalition 
partners during the legislative term. This potential for discontinuity empirically affects almost 
30% of all member state transposition efforts. Table 3 shows that there is variation among the 
member states: due to coalition instability, more than half of the Italian cases and almost one 
third of the 279 Austrian cases were subject to governmental change, while only 4% of 
British, 10% of Finnish and 15% of German cases experienced governmental change during 
the process. Unsurprisingly, the amount of governmental change is lower than the number of 
elections, but every member state experienced governmental change during the transposition 
of some directives.  
However, as already mentioned, elections and governmental change are rather crude 
indicators for discontinuity. For example, governments could be re-elected and have similar 
preferences in the following legislative term, and this would raise little concern about a 
potential democratic deficit or lack of legitimacy. A more important indicator for 
discontinuity should be change in governmental preferences that is when the preferences of 
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for the implementation of the former government's activity. While there exists no indicator for 
the governmental preferences on each directive, this study proposes using party manifestos for 
identifying the governmental (coalition) preferences across policy sectors and over time 
(author). To control for the possibility that a former government might have been outvoted 
under Council qualified majority voting and preference change from the former to the current 
government might even include the preferences of the newly elected government in the 
directive’s policy, tables 4 and 5 list the number of national transposition responses related to 
directives adopted under unanimity in parentheses. These unanimity cases also demonstrate 
how difficult a change of a decision would be for the following majority with different 
preferences from the former.
4
Using party manifestos for the identification of governmental preferences requires 
several steps. First, national party manifestos are merged with data on the party composition 
of the corresponding governments, including the date of their inauguration and dismissal. 
Secondly, in order to relate these data to policy areas, party positions are computed for 
specific EU policy sectors like agricultural, trade and internal market politics.
5 The resulting 
set of cases was completed with a European integration dimension referring to the pro- and 
anti-European attitude of political parties (Hix 1999, Gabel and Hix 2002, Hooghe et al. 2002, 
Pennings 2002). This dimension is coded for all proposals in addition to the sector-specific 
dimension that varies across all directives to incorporate party preference changes in the 
respective area of agricultural, common rules, energy/ environment or internal market. To 
estimate governmental coalition positions, the positions of the coalitional parties are averaged. 
Independent from other coding possibilities, the main advantage is that these positions vary 
across policy areas and over time. More specifically, the positions provide information on 
which sector-specific outcomes are preferred by governments over time, while the EU 
dimension should cover whether a government favors policy making at the domestic or EU 
level. 
Looking at the two-stage process and preference change, table 4a lists how often and 
to what extent the sector-specific preferences of the former government diverge from those of 
the government that transposed the directive. No preference change existed in about two-
thirds of all cases, while minimal change (measured as one standard deviation from the mean) 
                                                 
4 Studies on the Council’s voting record report a significant trend towards consensus decision making among 
member states and dispute the effective application of qualified majority voting (Mattila and Lane 200, Mattila 
2004, Heisenberg 2005). 
5 In order to avoid missing data, I applied the manifesto calculation procedure – a mix of policy positions and 
weights (Laver 2001). 
  12is observable for 632 cases. Moderate and maximum change, however, existed in almost 2000 
cases, and this governmental preference change occurred in both directions. The lower 
number of unanimity cases reveals that maximum change existed for 522 of 2797 cases, 
meaning that the percentage of drastic changes is even higher under unanimity rule. 
Moreover, we find changes in about 60% of all unanimity cases, which is notably above the 
average of about 30% for all cases. Looking more closely on the sector-specific cases of 
maximum preference change, table 4b reveals that Austria, Denmark and Sweden most 
frequently registered such drastic changes, while Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and UK 
experienced rather minimal changes during most national transposition.  
Finally, tables 5a and 5b show governmental preference change on whether national 
legislative competences should (in general) be delegated to the EU level. With reference to 
table 4a, the number of cases with maximum change is slightly lower than the number of 
cases with sector-specific change, and moderate preference change exists more often with 
respect to EU affairs. Interestingly, we find more maximum and moderate changes in favour 
of EU integration than against it. This also holds true for cases under unanimity. Applied to 
the member states, Austria, France and Sweden are the outliers with maximum changes, 
followed by Denmark. Some countries, such as the Netherlands or Finland almost lack cases 
of transposition exposed to maximum governmental preference change in European affairs. 
 
Discontinuity and Change: Another source for the EU’s democratic deficit? 
Before examining parliamentary deficit and discontinuity of EU lawmaking in the member 
states over a period of more than 15 years, it has been shown that continuity is a central 
feature of democratic government in all member states, in which political authority and power 
are temporally limited. Voters assign authority and policy-making power to representatives 
for a limited period, and in almost all member states, the authority and policy-making 
activities of the representatives formally end with parliamentary dissolution or the end of 
legislative terms; thus, pending initiatives usually expire to prevent discontinuity between the 
political mandate and policy making. Moreover, the newly elected representatives may more 
easily change the decisions of the former, because domestic voting systems are less restrictive 
and allow the newly elected majority to initiate, amend and adopt their programmatic issues. 
In contrast to the member states, the voting system of the EU hardly allows for policy change 
and the two-stage process of EU lawmaking induces a high potential of discontinuity between 
the governmental representatives who adopt directives and those (newly elected) governments 
that are obliged to implement the decisions of their predecessors.  
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absent in this two-stage process of adopting and implementing directives. Except for the 
Scandinavian countries, the parliaments of the member states have no ex ante control over 
their governmental agents, and they are rarely included in the ex post transposition stage. This 
suggests that only the parliaments of the Scandinavian countries can make attempts to develop 
a counter-strategy. The empirical analysis reveals that most countries use non-parliamentary 
instruments to transpose directives, even though they could go through parliament. 
Parliaments as the principals have accordingly little chances to learn about their agents’ 
actions, and agency loss is very likely in case of disagreement between the principal’s and 
agent’s interest. This lack of parliamentary control and involvement threatens to intensify the 
problems raised by discontinuity because voters and their representatives are losing their right 
to receive valuable information about policy making when the latter are de facto excluded 
from lawmaking. 
The findings on over 15 years of national transposition confirm that the EU carries this 
risk of discontinuity. In almost one third of all cases, election and governmental change occur 
during the time lag between adoption and transposition. Moreover, a similar number of cases 
documents that the preferences between the previous adopting and the subsequent 
implementing government sometimes change drastically, but EU lawmaking obliges the 
successor to implement policies supported by the former government. While it could be 
argued that a former government has been outvoted under qualified majority voting and 
perhaps pursued the “wrong” interests of the following majority, this result is controlled for 
the fact that such drastic changes also occur under unanimity rule. In particular in Austria and 
Sweden, and to a lesser extent in Denmark, Greece, France, and the Netherlands, the 
following government had to implement sector-specific decisions that were supported by a 
former government with very different preferences. In these countries, public support for 
European integration has also decreased in recent years. 
Under these conditions and with respect to the increasingly restrictive voting system of 
the EU as well as the growing importance of directives, discontinuity seems to pose a 
considerable problem for the accountability and legitimacy of EU lawmaking. On closer 
inspection of the policy domains, we find that discontinuity hits the internal market domain 
particularly hard, where most drastic preference changes occur, followed by Common rules. 
In these domains, there is a large gap between the actors deciding on policies and those who 
are forced to bear the responsibility in the implementation process. At the same time, 
governments prefer to exclude their parliaments and most frequently use executive 
  14instruments to transpose directives. Insofar, discontinuity may not only pose another source 
for the democratic deficit of EU lawmaking, but it also contributes to its increasing 
bureaucratic nature. 
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  17Figure 1:  Participation of the EP in EU legislation passed between 1986 and 2002 
 
Source: Original Data extrapolated from PreLex and Celex (author 2006) 
These data refer to  8,475 decisions (D), directives (L) and regulations (R) proposed by the 
Commission. The applied legislative procedure is documented in PreLex.  
  18Figure 2a: Share of Parliamentary Involvement in the Transposition of EU Directives 
between 1986 and 2002 (N=8382 transposition measures) 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Share of Parliamentary Involvement (No/Yes – 0/1) in the Transposition of 
EU Directives between 1986 and 2002 (N=8382 transposition measures) 
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Table 2:  EU member states’ response to EU directives between 1986 and 2002 
Member states 
Total number 
of EU 
directives 
(transposition 
not required) 
Pending on
1 Nov 2004 
(no match 
Celex3) 
No available 
transposition 
deadline  
No adoption 
date for 
measure 
available 
Non-
Transposition
no Measure 
reported 
Measure 
passed prior 
to directive or 
after deadline 
 
 
Total 
measures 
considered 
Austria*  730(3) 18  (8) 58  78 111 175  279
Belgium  1599(3) 18  (9) 190 38 232 510  599
Denmark  1600(4) 18  (9) 190 89 210 287  793
Finland*  730(1) 18  (8) 58 54 63 104  424
France  1600(3) 18  (9) 190 12 215 472  681
Germany  1599(3) 18  (9) 189 99 279 435  567
Greece  1600(3) 18  (9) 190 88 216 590  486
Ireland  1600(3) 18  (9) 190 126 227 446  581
Italy  1600(4) 18  (9) 190 56 199 569  555
Luxembourg  1600(0) 18  (9) 193 19 183 628  550
Netherlands  1599(3) 18  (8) 189 97 268 316  700
Portugal  1600(1) 18  (9) 192 24 127 701  528
Spain  1600(2) 18  (9) 191 75 104 472  729
Sweden*  730(4) 18  (8) 57 30 97 273  243
United 
Kingdom  1600(3) 18  (9) 190 155 209 349  667
Total  21,387(40) 270 (131) 2457 1040 2740 6327  8382
Source: Original Data extrapolated from Celex Sector 7 (downloaded on 01.11.2004) 
*For Austria, Finland and Sweden our data only includes directives enacted during the period 
of their membership, 1995 -2002 
  20Table  3:  Member State transposition instruments subject to national elections 
and changes in government between 1986 and 2002 
 
 
 Total  no  election  election 
no change in  
government 
change in 
 government 
Austria 279 156 123 189 90
Belgium 599 429 170 451 148
Denmark 793 481 312 399 394
Finland 424 371 53 381 43
France 681 488 193 448 233
Germany 567 364 203 484 83
Greece 486 326 160 396 90
Ireland 581 410 171 404 177
Italy 555 359 196 277 278
Luxembourg 550 403 147 493 57
Netherlands 700 553 147 517 183
Portugal 528 320 208 321 207
Spain 729 559 170 641 88
Sweden 243 153 90 198 45
United Kingdom  667 471 196 638 29
Total 8382 5843 2539 6237 2145
  21Table 4a:  Direction and extent of sector-specific governmental preference change 
affecting national transposition measures between 1986 and 2002 across all member 
states 
 
Source: Original Data extrapolated from Celex Sector 7 (downloaded on 01.11.2004) 
  no change   minimal changemoderate change maximum change Total 
no change  5860 (1752)  0 0 0 5860 (1752)
positive change  0  296 (98) 377 (166) 532 (271)  1205 (535)
Negative change  0  336 (82) 460 (177) 521 (251)  1317 (510)
Total  5860 (1752)  632 (180) 837 (343) 1053 (522) 8382 (2797)
Note: cases in parentheses indicate application of unanimity voting in Council as extrapolated 
from the Celex data 
 
 
 
Table  4b:  Extent of sector-specific governmental preference change affecting 
national transposition measures between 1986 and 2002 
 
  no change  minimal changemoderate changemaximum change Total 
Austria 163(45)  13(1) 35(12) 68(32)  279(90)
Belgium 417(118)  68(13) 85(54) 29(16)  599(201)
Denmark 530(167)  42(10) 79(33) 142(72)  793(282)
Finland 339(86)  27(9) 5(3) 53(32)  424(130)
France 493(148)  29(4) 57(22) 102(45)  681(219)
Germany 369(108)  79(19) 47(22) 72(42)  567(191)
Greece 328(104)  17(5) 44(9) 97(48)  486(166)
Ireland 419(105)  35(9) 47(26) 80(33)  581(173)
Italy 368(101)  37(5) 77(32) 73(36)  555(174)
Luxembourg 409(140)  24(10) 80(31) 37(19)  550(200)
Netherlands 484(157)  44(10) 71(22) 101(49)  700(238)
Portugal 323(98)  57(32) 88(27) 60(25)  528(182)
Spain 567(184)  38(12) 55(14) 69(35)  729(245)
Sweden 177(54)  11(5) 2(0) 53(33)  243(92)
United Kingdom  474(137)  111(36) 65(36) 17(5)  667(214)
Total 5860(1752)  632(180) 837(343) 1053(522)  8382(2797)
Source: Original Data extrapolated from Celex Sector 7 (downloaded on 01.11.2004). The 
data for Austria, Finland and Sweden only includes directives enacted during the period of 
their membership, 1995 -2002 
Note: Cases in parentheses indicate application of unanimity voting in Council as 
extrapolated from the Celex data. 
  22Table  5a:  Direction and extent of governmental EU preference change affecting 
national transposition measures between 1986 and 2002 across all member states 
 
Source: Original Data extrapolated from Celex Sector 7 (downloaded on 01.11.2004).  
  no change  minimal changemoderate change maximum change Total 
no change  5837 (1748)  0 0 0 5837 (1748)
positive change  0  216 (86) 502 (210) 506 (228)  1224 (524)
negative change  0  348 (154) 523 (195) 450 (176)  1321 (525)
Total  5837 (1748)  564 (240) 1025 (405) 956 (404) 8382 (2797)
Note: Cases in parentheses indicate application of unanimity voting in Council as 
extrapolated from the Celex data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  5b:  Extent of governmental EU preference change affecting national 
transposition measures between 1986 and 2002 
 
  no change  minimal changemoderate change maximum change Total 
Austria  163 (45)  0 20 (8) 96 (37)  279 (90)
Belgium  417 (118)  63 (32) 84 (32) 35 (19)  599 (201)
Denmark  530 (167)  0  101 (50) 162 (65)  793 (282)
Finland  339 (86)  45 (25) 36 (17) 4 (2)  424 (130)
France  493 (148)  2 (0) 0  186 (71)  681 (219)
Germany  369 (108)  0 142 (53) 56 (30)  567 (191)
Greece  328 (104)  41 (17) 89 (35) 28 (10)  486 (166)
Ireland  419 (105)  62 (26) 31 (9) 69 (33)  581 (173)
Italy  368 (101)  1 (1) 134 (50) 52 (22)  555 (174)
Luxembourg  409 (140)  0 49 (25) 92 (35)  550 (200)
Netherlands  484 (157)  82 (28) 134 (53) 0  700 (238)
Portugal  323 (98)  128 (55) 57 (20) 20(9)  528 (182)
Spain  567 (184)  82 (32) 37 (8) 43 (21)  729 (245)
Sweden  154 (50)  0 36 (20) 53 (22)  243 (92)
United Kingdom  474 (137)  58 (24) 75 (25) 60 (28)  667 (214)
Total  5837 (1748)  564 (240) 1025 (405) 956 (404) 8382 (2797)
Source: Original Data extrapolated from Celex Sector 7 (downloaded on 01.11.2004). The 
data for Austria, Finland and Sweden only includes directives enacted during the period of 
their membership, 1995 -2002 
Note: Cases in parentheses indicate application of unanimity voting in Council as 
extrapolated from the Celex data. 
 
  23Table 1: Legislative Procedures in 15 EU Member States: The Principle of Discontinuity and the Legislative Life of Bills 
 
        General* Institutions Comments
Austria  D at end of LP or 
dissolution 
Nationalrat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bundesrat 
Constitution: Article 27(1): "Die Gesetzgebungsperiode des Nationalrates dauert vier Jahre, vom Tag seines ersten Zusammentrittes an gerechnet, 
jedenfalls aber bis zu dem Tag, an dem der neue Nationalrat zusammentritt." 
Art. 28 (4): "Bei Eröffnung einer neuen Tagung des Nationalrates innerhalb der gleichen Gesetzgebungsperiode werden die Arbeiten nach dem Stand 
fortgesetzt, in dem sie sich bei der Beendigung der letzten Tagung befunden haben."  
(RP: §46(4): "Bei Eröffnung einer neuen Tagung des Nationalrates innerhalb derselben Gesetzgebungsperiode werden die Arbeiten nach dem Stand 
fortgesetzt, in dem sie sich bei der Beendigung der letzten Tagung befunden haben.")
18 
 
Constitution: Article 35(3): "(3) Nach Ablauf der Gesetzgebungsperiode eines Landtages oder nach seiner Auflösung bleiben die von ihm entsendeten 
Mitglieder des Bundesrates so lange in Funktion, bis der neue Landtag die Wahl in den Bundesrat vorgenommen hat." 
(RP: §3(2): "Nach Beendigung der Gesetzgebungsperiode eines Landtages bleiben die von ihm entsandten Bundesräte so lange in Funktion, bis der 
neue Landtag die Wahl in den Bundesrat vorgenommen hat.")
19
Belgium  D at end of LP or 
dissolution, but 
may be considered 
in next LP of one 
of the chambers 
has agreed to. If 
not adopted by 
both, bill dies 
within 8 years  
Chambre des 
Représentants 
 
Sènat 
For both houses (as of 2000, see Schorn 2000: 60-68) situation is unclear : 
Loi du 3 mars 1977 relative aux effects de la dissolution des Chambres legislatives à l’égard des projets et propositions de loi antérieurement désposés.  
Moniteur belge 12 mars 1977: Principle of  “non-caducité ” : bills expire only when neither house has voted (and passed it to the other house) by the 
end of the S, or when the resolution was introduced more than 8 years earlier. 
Loi du 6 avril 1995 (only applicaple for LP 1995-99): bills that have not passed through both houses are subject to D. 
Suggestions in a recommendation from the Service juidique du Sénat (see Schorn 2000: 62,66-68) range from the introduction of strict D,  to the limited 
retention of non-caducité, and even a regulation according to which the continued consideration of a bill would depend on the petition of 15 members of 
the respective house within a certain period.
1  
Addendum: 
1993: fundamental constitutional amendments altered the parliamentary structure from a pure bicameral system to a bicaméralisme inégalitaire with 
clear primacy of house of representatives in the legislative process.  The Sénat is no longer consulted in certain matters, or matiéres monocamériale.  
The regulation of D was (as of 2000) not modified.  Problematic of D is described in Schorn 2000: 60f. 
Situation in Feb. 2006: the problems mentioned above are not addressed in either the constitution or the current RPs. 
Denmark  D at end of S or 
dissolution 
Folketing (Parliament)  In the Constitution: § 41(4): “ In the case of a new election, and at the end of the sessional year, all Bills and other measures which have not been 
finally passed shall be void.” 
In the RP: Art. 10(3): “ In view of the planning of the legislative work, the majority of Bills which the Government intends to introduce during the 
sessional year should be introduced at the beginning of the sessional year in question.  As a rule, Bills should be introduced no later than by April 1
st in 
order to be passed within the current sessional year.” 
2
Finland  D at end of LP or 
dissolution 
Eduskunta (single 
chamber parliament) 
Constitution: § 49 - Continuity of consideration
“Consideration of matters unfinished in one parliamentary session continues in the following parliamentary session, unless parliamentary elections have 
been held in the meantime. However, the consideration of an interpellation or a statement by the Government does not continue in the following 
parliamentary session. The  consideration of a report by the Government shall continue during the following parliamentary session only if the 
Parliament specifically so decides. When necessary, the consideration of an international matter pending in the Parliament may continue during the 
parliamentary session following parliamentary elections.” 
5
France  D at end of LP, but 
may be considered 
in next LP  
Assemblée nationale:  
 
 
 
 
 
Sénat:  
Not explicitly regulated in either the constitution or the RP except under  “coutume constante” (circumstances remaining constant): "En vertu d'une 
coutume constante, l'Assemblée nationale nouvellement élue, n'est plus saisie des textes qui se trouvaient en instance devant l'Assemblée précedente" 
The Assemblé nationale is bound by D at end of LP, but may be considered in new LP if the Senat passes the bill without further amendment.
6
 
For the Sénat, bills are differentiated as  Projets de loi (Government bills) and Propositions de loi (Parliament bills) where Projets de loi: are not 
generally subject to discontinuity, and expire only after a change in government (Schorn 2000: 53, based on Pierre Avril, H`Jean Gicquel, 1996: Droit 
parlamentaire, p. 147). And Propositions de loi:  propositions from the Sénat expire with  the third session following initiation (Art. 28-2 der GO d. 
Senats, according to Schorn 2000: 53)
7
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        General* Institutions Comments
Germany  D at end of LP  Bundestag: bound by D at 
end of LP or dissolution 
 
Bundesrat: not bound by 
D 
“§125 Unerledigte Gegenstände: Am Ende der Wahlperiode des Bundestages gelten all Vorlagen als erledigt.  Dies gilt nicht für Petitionen und für 
Vorlagen, die keiner Beschlussfassung bedürfen.” 
3
 
“(...) zu beachten ist jedoch, dass der Grundsatz der Diskontinuität nur für den Bundestag gilt, nicht aber für Bundesrat oder Bundesregierung.  Allerdings 
wird auch von einer Staatspraxis berichtet, wonach Gesetzesentwürfe, zu denen der Bundesrat schon Stellung genommen hat, die aber dem alten 
Bundestag nicht mehr zugeleitet wurden, dem Bundesrat nochmals vorgelegt werden .” 
4
Greece  D at end of LP or 
dissolution 
Vouli (single chamber 
parliament) 
Art. 85: "8. Le dépôt de projet ou proposition de loi est valable pour toute la législature sous réserve des paragraphes 2 et 3 respectivement, de l’article 
suivant." 
10
Ireland  D at end of LP or 
dissolution, but 
may be carried 
over to next LP 
Seanad Éireann (upper 
house) 
 
 
 
 
Dáil Éireann (lower 
house) 
RP: "Lapsed Bills:  
§122. (1) Any Bill which lapses by reason of a general election for the Seanad may be proceeded with after the general election at the stage it had reached 
prior to the general election upon a Resolution restoring it to the Order Paper. 
(2) Unless the Resolution restoring the Bill to the Order Paper directs otherwise, the Bill shall be proceeded with at the commencement of the particular 
stage which it had reached prior to the general election.” 
11
 
RP: "Restoration of Lapsed Bills to Order Paper:  
§135. (1) Any Bill, which lapses by reason of the dissolution of the Daíl, before it has reached its final stage, may be proceeded with on the reassembly of 
the Daíl at the stage it had reached prior to the dissolution, upon a Resolution restoring it to the Order Paper. 
(2) Unless the Resolution restoring the Bill to the Order Paper directs otherwise, the Bill shall be proceeded with at the commencement of the particular 
stage which it had reached prior to the dissolution of the Daíl..” 
12
Italy  D at end of LP or 
dissolution, but 
may be considered 
in next LP 
Camera die Deputati 
(house of representatives) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senato della Republica 
RP (official English Translation): Part XXII, Rule 107: “Bills already considered by the previous Parliament 1. If in the six months immediately following 
the beginning of a new Parliament a bill is introduced which reproduces in full the text of a bill approved by the Chamber in the previous Parliament, the 
House may, if it declares such bill to be urgent and at the request of the Government or of a Group Chairperson, set a time limit of fifteen days for the 
Committee to report.  2. Once this time is up, the President shall enter the bill in the agenda of the House or of the Committee acting in a legislating 
capacity, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Rule 25. 3. In the same six-month period from the beginning of the new Parliament, each Committee may 
decide, subject to a brief preliminary consideration, to report to the House on any bills approved by the same Committee in a reporting capacity during the 
previous Parliament, and to adopt the report presented at that time. 4. For bills initiated by citizens, the procedure envisaged in paragraph 1 for 
introduction shall not be necessary. When such bills have been approved by the Chamber in the previous Parliament or have been considered in full at the 
Committee stage, if the Government or a Group Chairperson so requests, the provisions set out in the preceding paragraphs shall apply; otherwise the bill 
shall be referred again to the appropriate Committee according to subject matter, following ordinary procedures.”
 13 
 
RP (official English Translation): "Rule 81: Bills already passed or considered in the previous Parliament: 1.In the case of bills introduced in the first six 
months of a new Parliament which are identical to the text of bills approved only by the Senate in the previous Parliament, the government or twenty 
Senators may, within one month of their introduction, a move that they be declared 80 bills and that summary proceedings may be adopted as provided in 
the following paragraphs. (...) 3.Should the Senate resolve that the bill is urgent and adopts the summary proceedings, if the bill is referred to a committee 
sitting in a reporting capacity it shall be authorised to report orally to the Senate, and the bill shall be automatically set down in the calendar or the Work 
Plan immediately following the current one so that the Senate can vote on it, with the speakers restricted to the rapporteur, the representative of the 
government and the sponsors of any amendments, and the explanations of vote provided by Rule 109(2) shall be permitted. (...) 5.standing committees to 
which bills are referred in a reporting capacity which identical to bills which had been fully considered by the same committees in the previous Parliament 
may resolve, within the first seven months from the beginning of the new Parliament, and after a after summary consideration thereof, to adopt the reports 
submitted in the previous Parliament without further debate.” 
14
Addendum: 
The law "Legge La Pergola" (Nr. 86/1989) is of particular importance with reference to Community legislation and in connection with discontinuity 
because it quickly resolved the related legislative backlog  (according to Chiti in Schwarze 1996: 254; the legal text is available online in Italian) 
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        General* Institutions Comments
Luxembourg  Bill does not lapse 
with end of S or LP 
Chambre de Députés 
(single chamber 
parliament) 
Indirect reference in the RP: Art. 61: "Ne peuvent être réintroduites au cours d'une même session les propositions que la Chambre n'a pas prises en 
considération ou qu'elle n'a pas adoptées.” 
15
The 
Netherlands 
Bill does not lapse 
with end of S or LP 
Eerste Kamer
16 
 
Tweede Kamer
17
The RP of the  Eerste Kamer is only available in Dutch 
 
There is no mention of discontinuity in either the constitution or RP of the Tweede Kammer. 
Addendum: 
Relative to discontinuity in administrative law, refer to the "General Administrative Law Act" (GALA, niederl.: Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht, AWB) 
from 1994  (vgl. Widdershoven/de Lange in Schwarze 1996: 532) 
Portugal  Bill usually die at 
the end of  LP or 
dissolution 
Assembleia da República 
(single chamber 
parliament) 
RP: "Article 47 (Legislative sessions and normal parliamentary term) 1. Legislative sessions shall last for one year commencing on 15 September. 2. 
Without prejudice to suspensions decided by a two-thirds majority of all Members present, the Assembly of the Republic’s normal parliamentary term 
shall be from 15 September to 15 June." 
"Article 135 (Renewal of initiatives): 1. Bills that are not put to the vote in the legislative session in which they are submitted shall not require 
resubmission in the following legislative sessions, unless the  legislature itself comes to an end. 2. Government bills shall lapse upon the resignation or 
removal of the Government, or, when the initiative was taken by a regional legislative assembly, when the respective legislature comes to an end.” 
20
Addendum: 
Relative to discontinuity in administrative law, refer to the "Código do Procedimento Administrativo" (CPA, Nr. 442/91 from 15.11.1991). (Botelho 
Moniz/Moura Pinheiro in Schwarze 1996: 662; CPA is available online in Portugese. 
Sweden  Bill continue from 
year to year but die 
if not disposed of 
within the year 
following the year 
of introduction 
Riksdag (single chamber 
parliament) 
Riksdag Act: Chapter 5. Settlement of business: 
"Deferral of business: Art. 10: A matter shall be settled in the electoral period in which it is introduced. The Riksdag may however consent to defer 
consideration to the first parliamentary session of the next electoral period. Consideration of a matter put forward during a break in the work of the 
Chamber lasting until the first parliamentary session of the next electoral period is treated as having been deferred to that parliamentary session. The same 
applies to consideration of a matter which the Riksdag has not had time to settle when the work of the Chamber was suspended due to an extraordinary 
election. (...) 
A draft law held in abeyance for twelve months under Chapter 2, Article 12, paragraph three of the Instrument of Government shall be examined and 
approved before the end of the following calendar year. If another draft law is closely connected with legislation held in abeyance under this rule, the 
Riksdag may determine that it shall be settled within the time applying to the examination and approval of the draft law held in abeyance. If a matter 
under this paragraph cannot be settled within the time prescribed due to the calling of an extraordinary election, it shall be settled as soon as possible after 
the newly-elected Riksdag convenes.” (Note that supplementary provisions apply) 
21
Spain  D at end of LP  Congreso de los 
Diputados (house of 
representatives): bound 
by D 
Senat: bound by D  
"PART XIII Business pending upon expiry of the term of Congress, Section 207: Upon the dissolution of Congress or at the expiry of its term, all 
business pending examination and decision by the House shall lapse, except for such business as must constitutionally be transacted by the Permanent 
Deputation." (RP: 115, 68 C)
22 
 
Standing Order of the Senate, First Additional Provision: “ Upon dissolution of the Senate or expiration of its mandate, all the matters pending 
consideration and decision by the House shall be cancelled except those that, for constitutional reasons, must be referred to the Permanent Deputation.” 
23
United 
Kingdom 
D at end of S, but 
may be considered 
in next S 
Public bills: all die at the 
end of S (prorogation)
8
 
Private bills 
Prorogation as a constitutional convention is not documented but is considered to be a gentlemen's agreement (Schorn 2000: 57); 
Public bills may be government bills as well as private member bills, but de facto most are government bills (Schorn 2000: 58) 
 
Private bills: Initiatives relating to the activities of public administration or an individual and initiated by groups or persons outside of parliament  (Schorn 
2000: 58): Prorogation, but may be continued in the next session if decided by parliament.  
Addendum: 
The distinction here is not made between different state organs because the government more or less defines all legislation. Instead, we differentiate 
between the type of initiative when refering to D "es der Regierung zu ermöglichen, ihr Legislativprogramm schnell und effektiv durchzubringen" 
(Schorn 2000: 59). 
9
Legend: D: Discontinuity,   RP:   Rules of internal procedure,   LP:   Legislative period,   S:  Session    * For more general information, please refer to Döring (1995:242, Table 7.7). 
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